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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
S'TATE OF UTAH
C..\LYlX H. JOHNSOX,
I) la i 11 tiff -Respondent,
vs.
COH~\VALL \VAREHOUSE CO~l
P ..\XY and EBXEf-;T JA~lES,
JJefc 11d ant.-.·-Appella1d0.

Case No.
10176

BlUBF OF, PLAIN'l.,IFF-RESPONDEKT
~'L\TE~IEXT

OF THE 1\ATCRE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff on a thru stn~et, ~t>eond South in Salt Lake
rtah, heading eatlt, was struck on left rear by defendant truck southbound on rrhird \Vest and turning
left after ~topping at stop sign.
Cit~·,

DlSPOSITlOX li\ LO\VER COURT
(..\~

stated in Defendants' Brief.) The jury, as in the
trial, found for Plaintiff, jndg1nent was entered,
and motion for new trial was denied.
fir~t

RELIEF SOrGHT OX APPE.AL
...iffirn1ance.
ST~-1.TE~IEXT

OF FACTS
On .JLay 31, 1962, at approximately± :±3 o'clock, P ..JI.,
at ~eeond South and Third \Yest, Salt Lake City, rtah,
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Plaintiff drove an automobile 20 to 25 l\LP.H. easterly
on Second South Street, there a thru street, on the int~iclt·
lane. Each street is 92 feet wide. Plaintiff's auto, when
its left rear portion where struck was 77' 10" ( H-305)
straight east into the intersection measuring from the
curb line, was struck by Defendant's truck which was
56'2" (R-505) south of the curb line into the intersection,
turning left "in a circular manner" (R-436) to go east
on Second South (Exhibit 2D1). Defendant truck had
stopped for a stop sign at Second South, according to
Plaintiff at the curbline (R-444), according to Defendant's driver at pedestrian lane (R-431), waited for several
cars to go by, then proceeded to turn left, Plaintiff estimated at 10 to 15 miles per hour (R-522), Defendant
driver estimated accelerating frmn 7 to "about 10" miles
per hour (R-436).

:#1~
~~~·

:.

1

Plaintiff stated at the scene to the invt'stigating officer (R~410, Line 23), on deposition (Deposition P. 12,
Line 22), at the first trial, an~ at the second trial (R-512,
Line 2.3) that he was "going over the tracks" ·when he saw
the truck stopped. Although Plaintiff in deposition estimated his distance then at 150 to 200 feet, it turns out the
tracks are approximately 125' back from point of impact (Exhibit 2D1) thus fixing Plaintiff's position, moving of course, as he observed defendant truck.
Plaintiff agrees with defendant that "at the retrial
... the evidence was substantially the same" (Defendant's
Brief P. 17); therefore, the previous decision, l~tah Supreme Court No. 9921, in its statement of the facts and
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o)

eotH'Iu:-;ion~

<·an be adopt (•<L It <·oncludes the qtwstion of
<'Oil t ributory negligence are jury questiom.;. It n·ad~, with respect to the facts, as follows:
nt•gl ig<'TH'P and

"In vi<·w of the jm·)''s fjndings ·we view the
t•vidPne<' in a light nrost favorable to plaintiff. In
~twh a light it would appear that plaintiff first
ob:-;erved the truck which collided with his car
whPn it wm; stopped at a stop sign on the north
~idP of Second South and r:l--,hird West as he was
tnrrcling in an easterly direction while crossing
some railroad tracks west of '"l_lhird West on Second South when he was about 150 feet frmn th:·
inter~Pction and again when he was about 75 feet
from the intersection of those streets. As he continued traveling he looked to the south and east
and had entered the intersection when he looked
to tlw north again which was in11nediately before
he ·was struck by the truck. I-Ie \Yas traveling
bdwePn 20 and 25 n1iles per hour. He was the
favored driver to enter the intersection first if a
vehicle was not already in it or so close to coming
in as to constitute a hazard since he ·was traveling
in an easterly direction and for traffic traveling in
an easterly direction Second South Street was a
through streef at its intersection with Third West
~tn·<•t. .At that intersection there are stop signs
for north, south and westbound traffic but not for
eastbound traffic. The accident occurred about
-t :-t.J p.rn. when traffic was heavy. Plaintiff was
ahnost t-wo-thirds across Third vV est Street when
the left rear side of his car was hit hy the truck.
The intersection is about 95 feet \Yide on Third
\Y Pst and about 92 feet wide on Second South
frmn curb to curb .
.. The driver of the truck estirnated that plaintiff's car was about 100 feet away frmn the inter-
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section when a traffic break occurred and he
started to get into the intersection to make the
turn into Second South. He estilnated his speed as
between 7 and 10 miles per hour, although he had
no speedometer in his truck. Plaintiff in the short
space of time he saw the truck had the impression
it was barreling into him. From the physical evidence it appears that plaintiff's car was approximately 78 feet east of the west curb of Third West
Street while the truck was about 56 feet south of
the north curb of Second South Street when the
impact occurred.
"Although frorn the testinwny of the driver
of the truck it could have been found that he first
observed plaintiff's car when it was about 200 or
150 feet from the west curb of Third VI est and
about 100 feet away from the intersection when he
started to make his turn at a speed of about 5 to 10
miles per hour, these were 1nere estimates and the
jury was not bound to believe them. 1'he jury
found that plaintiff had not failed to yield the
right of way. Such a finding can only be consonant with a belief by the jury that the truck entered
the intersection after plaintiff's car had already
entered or at a time when plaintiff's car was close
to the intersection and traveling at a rate of speed
which would constitute an immediate hazard.
"The traffic was heavy. Fron1 plaintiff's
testimony the jury could reasonably have found
that the truck was still stopped at the stop sign
when plaintiff was 75 feet away fron1 the intersection when again observed by hi1n before the collision. That plaintiff having observed the truck
still stopped and being on a through street continued driving while observing traffic to the south
and east. Thus there was a reasonable basis in the
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evidE•nel~

for a findi11g that plaintiff was not guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law in
failing to avoid allowing the truck to run into the
lt-ft rear end of his ear. The question of whether
plaintiff under the circun1stances disclosed by the
evidence was guilty of contributory negligence
which proxiinately caused the collision was one
l'or detennination by the jury. The court therefore Prred in concluding that plaintiff was guilty
of eontributory negligence as a matter of law and
~ranting a judg1nent of non.,uit against him."
Defendant complains (Defendants' Brief, P. 4) of 50
but Defendant requested 29, all of which
Wl'l'P given or given in substance except a request for a
din•eted verdict and one requesting a finding of no disability. Of the total instructions, there were 21 stocks,
one on drunages, 7 of Plaintiff's requests given (in addition to dan1age instruction), 2 frarned by the court (No.
:!.7 and No. 29) (R. 353 and R-355), and 19 of Defendants'
reqnPsts given verbatin1 (Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
1-l. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23). (R-331 to R-349).
instruction~,

ARGUniENT
POINT I. INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT PREJUDICIAL.

Section -±1-G-7-±.10, Utah Code Annotated, reads as
follows:
"(a)

In the event that a driver, after having
driven past a yield sign or a stop sign, is
involved in a collision \Yith a pedestrian
having right of way in a crosswalk or a
vehicle having right of way in the intersection such collision shall be deemed prima
facie evidence of his failure to yield the
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right of way as required by this section,
but shall not be considered negligence per
se in determining legal liability for such
accident."
Instruction No. 27 read as follows (R-353) :

;:;

]1:

' "The laws of State of Utah provide that
where a driver has driven past a stop sign into an
intersection and a collision occurs, the collision
shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the failure
to yield the right of way on the part of the driver
passing the stop sign but shall not be considered
negligence per se in determining legal liability for
such accident.
Defendants apparently complain that in Instruction
No. 27 there should have been inserted after the first
clause the words "with a vehicle having right of way in
the intersection."
We are then concerned, and this court must determine, whether the words in the statute just referred to,
"vehicle having right of way in the intersection," refer
to the vehicle on the thru street, as generally having
"right of way" because of the nature of the intersection,
or whether such words refer to the ultimate determination of who has the right of way in the particular situation.
It is submitted and urged that said words "vehicle
having right of way in the intersection" in said statute
refer to the vehicle on the thru street (or otherwise entitled by the nature of the intersecton or regulation signs,
etc., to the position of favored driver).
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/t

The n·ason
lw words "vehich• having right of
in tlw int(·r~t>dion" wPn· unnecessary in this instructioll, ~o. :27, is that the jury kuew by ample evidence not
,li~ptdt>(l and indeed as a matter of law in this case (Ex.
~IH) who \\'a~ on the thru street and who was entering,
nnd didn't havp to be and should not be told to redetermine this. In fact, to have told the jury to re-labor that
qtu·~tion would have been confusing tv the1n. They then
\rould have• wondered-regarding the 01nitted language
"n•hieh• having right of way in the intersection" does
that reft>r to vehicle on thru street-a matter not in disputP-or to the ultilnate question of who is to blmne.
\\'il~·

The jury could not have been 1nisled by the instruction as givPn even if it is found to contain super technieal error. The broad edict enacted by the statute in question, -!1-G-7 -!.10, was that a driver entering a thru street,
if lw is involved in a collision, is at first blush the driver
failing in his duty. It is only c01nn1on sense enacted into
::-;tatntP.
That the words in the statute "vehicle having right
of way in the intersection" refer to the vehicle, in such a
rasP as this, which is on the thru street, is indicated by the
title of the section, the title reading Failure to yield right
of zray-Effect of collision-Rule on entering stop or
yield intersection-Yield right of way.
That section, -!1-6-7 ±.10 was enacted Laws of 1961,
Chapter 86, Art. 2, House Bill X o. 159. It is not a part of
the lTnifonn Yehicle Code. It has been proposed as a
part, and the writer is inforn1ed Utah is the only state yet
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to adopt it. The latest edition of the Unifonn Vehicle
Code, 1962, Section 11-403, adopts a prilna facie rule
against drivers driving past a yield sign without stopping but has not included such a prima facie rule against
a driver driving past a stop sign after stopping. Section
11-403 reads:
" .. Provided, however, that if such a
driver is involved in a collision with a vehicle
in the intersection after driving past a yield sign
without stopping, such collision shall be deemed
prima facie evidence of his failure to yield the
right of way."
The legislatures have gradually affirmed the position generally taken by the motorist, that the vehicle entering the thru street or turning left n1ust see that the
way is clear. In Porter vs. Mut1~al Insurance Co., 10 Wis.
2nd 314, 102 N.W. 2d ?72, noted in Fisher, Law of Right
of Way and' Traffic Law Enforcement, 1964 pocket part,
page 117, the court, in conunenting on the vVisconsin
Revised Code and attempting to get at the intent of the
legislature in the revised code, quoted the annotator of
the legislative council as follows :
"The present law relating to the right of way
of left-turning vehicles seems to prescribe a shifting of right of way. This is inconsistent with the
popular notion that the driver of the left-turning
vehicle must yield to through traffic ... Note the
Uniform Vehicle Code no longer has this objectionable provision for shifting of right of way
from one driver to the other."
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f n Lau' uf lli,r;ht of IV uy and Traffic Law Enforcemt·nt hy .Judge ]~dward C. Fisher, Associate Counsel,
~orth\\'t'st rnivt·rsity Traffic Institute, the author comlllt>nb, 19G-± pocket pn rt, page 11~:
''The objectionable 'shift' of right of "\vay
from one driver to the other at son1e indefinable
moment and in smne undisclosed 1nanner featured
in all versions of the Uniform Traffic Code prior
to the revision of 19G2 is now eliminated."
And hl' further eonunents, 1964 pocket part, page 117:

"By passage of lLB. 159 the Utah Legislature reinovPcl the shift frmn the left-turn rule."
It is obYious the language allegedly i1nproperly mnittecl from Instruction 1\ o. :27 refers to thu vehicle on the
thru street and not to the vehicle ultiu1ately found to
han• the right of way; therefore•, the instruction properly
excluded this language.

Bates vs. B,urns ( 1955), 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P .2d 290,
quoted in Defendants' Brief (P. 12), was decided several
yt>ars prior to the 19Gl cnachnl'nt above quoted, that is,
~l·dion 41-6-7 -±.lOa; therefore is no help.
The trend of the law was long ago noted in Grat2;iano vs. Grudy, (19±8), 83 Ohio App. 265, 78 N.E. 2d 766,
Fisher, 196± pocket part 108, where the court, in cmnmenting on a left-turn case, said:
"A careful consideration of provisions of the
Code discloses a purpose to favor vehicles moving in a straight line over YPhicl:s changing. direction. Thus, traffic is kept n1ov1ng and vehicles
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changing direction are not permitted to join the
flow of traffic except upon observance of the controlling rules of safety."
Defendants' Brief, Page 11, claims that the same
error was committed in the second trial as the first. This
is not so. In the first trial, the Court erroneously instructed the jury that the entry of the Defendant driver "into a
highway controlled by a stop sign, and his being involved
in a collision in the intersection in this case, is prima
facie evidence that Plaintiff had the right of way ... "
In the second trial, the Court, after study with counsel
in chambers of the decision of the Supreme Court covering the first trial, correctly instructed the jury (R-353)
that the entry of the Defendant driver into an intersection "past a stop sign into an intersection and the collision occurs, the collision shall be deemed prima facie
evidence of the failure to yield the right of way ... "
There is a vast difference between "prilna facie evidence of the failure to yield the right of way" and "prima
facie evidence that Plaintiff had the right of way."
Defendants' Brief (P. 16) complains "In Instruction
27 and 28 the trial court told the jury that l\Ir. Johnson
had only to get involved in a collision to have the right
of way, ... " Actually the court told the jury that if :Mr.
Johnson was on a thru street and had a collision with a
driver having driven past a stop sign, that such "collision
shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the failure to
yield the right of way on the part of driver passing the
stop sign but shall not be considered negligence per se
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in th•krmining legal liability for such accident"-and
that is the law.
POINT II.

INSTRUCTIONS WERE CORRECT

Dt•t't•JHlant;-; concede (Defendants' Brief, P. 14) "Admith·dly, in this case, correct instructions on right of way
were given by the court, but these instructions did not
han• the effPd of nullifying the erroneous prejudicial
(•l'l'(•d of Instructions 27 and 28."

It it:' sub1nitted that Instructions 27 and 28 were corrPd and that other instructions referred to by Defendants as colTPet instructions had they been given without
an instruction covering the statute quoted, that is, 41-6i-!.10, would have been incorrect and would not have carri('d out the legislative intent.

Defendants claim (Brief P. 11) that "Instruction :2S in effect directed right of way in favor of the
plaintiff, as that instruction told the jury the fact of collision is prilua facie evidence of defendant's failure to
yield the right of way, and, hence, of negligence on their
part." Instruction 28 (H-35-±) defined pri1na facie negligence and negligence per se and aparently did so corredly and hardly can be said to "in effect directed right
of ·way.... "
Therefore, there is little need to comment on the
eases cited for authority that correct instructions cannot
cure erroneous instructions.
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It is eh1nentary that error to be reversible must be
prejudicial and inconsistencies not such as would alter
the outcome of the case siiould avail Defendants little.

:le

POINT III. INSTRUCTIONS HEREIN WERE IN ACCORD WITH PRIOR DECISION.

Again Instruction 9-L on the first trial is not the
same as Instruction 27, second trial. In the first trial the
court erroneously instructed the jury that "that the entry of the defendant driver 'into a highway controlled
by a stop sign and his being involved in a collision in
the intersection, in this case, is prima facie evidence that
plaintiff had the right of way ... '"In the second trial the
language was straightened out to be consistent with the
statute and referred to "prin1a facie evidence of the failure to yield the right of way ... " (R-353)
The instructions could not have been misunderstood,
were not misleading, were in accordance with the statute
and consistent with the prior decision.
CONCLUSION
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GAYLE DEAN HUNT
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah, and
DWIGHT L. KING
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
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I hereby certify that on this ........ day of September,
1964, I mailed two copies of this Brief by U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, to Raymond M. Berry, Attorney at
Law, 455 East 4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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